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ADEQUACY OF NOTICE -DUE PROCESS
GEORGE O'DEA
The purpose of this comment is to survey some of the Washington
statutes and case authorities which involve notice, and to discuss them
in reference to a number of recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions involving procedural due process considerations. It is believed
that a broadened scope and meaning have been attached to "notice,"
as a requirement of procedural due process. This survey has been
confined to the areas categorized as proceedings in rem, but it is not
exhaustive of them.
DUE PROCESS
"The Mullane case .. .was a proceeding in persomim, . . . The
proceeding herein is in rem."' The value to be attached to this and
similar statements frequently made by courts in answer to an attack
on the adequacy of notice is doubtful.
Procedural due process, as it is envisioned by the fourteenth
amendment, includes all of the procedural steps required to deprive
a person of life, liberty, or property.2 Frequently, the requirement is
stated as consisting of reasonable notice and an opportunity to be
heard.' The approach of the Court to due process cases frequently
has been to go behind the state court record and make an independent
finding on the fairness of the proceeding.' The standards by which
fairness is judged are not precise or explicit, but they conform to
the social philosophy of individual members of the Court.'
State courts frequently have relied on the distinctions between in
personam, quasi-in-rem, and in rem proceedings. ' The difference
between in personam and in rem was set forth by one court as follows:
I In re Shew's Estate, 48 Wn2d 732, 734, 296 P.2d 667, 669 (1956).2 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1889); Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S.
701 (1884); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1938). See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1882).
3 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin,
287 U.S. 156 (1932); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).4 WooD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1951), see particularly pages 412, 414, 415, 417.
5 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
0 See note 4 supra.
7 Cf. Hill v. Persons Claiming Any Interest, 329 Mich. 683, 46 N.W.2d 584 (1951);
In re Shew's Estate, 48 Wn.2d 732, 296 P.2d 667 (1956); Cook, The Powers of Courts
of Equity, 15 COLUm. L. REv. 37, 106, 288 (1915).
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'... (I)n personan and 'in ren' differ in that the former... [is] ...
directed against specific persons and seek[s] personal judgments,
while the latter... [is] . . . directed against the thing or property or
status of a person and seeks judgment thereto as against the world.8
The term "quasi-in-rem" was explained as follows:
A quasi-in-rein proceeding . . . [is] . . . an action between parties
where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned
by them or of some interest therein, and in which the judgment
operates only as between the particular parties to the proceedings.'
Generally, in order to subject a person to a personal judgment there
must have been personal service within the jurisdiction."0 However,
substituted service has been satisfactory when the proceedings involve
an out of state resident or nonresident."
Notice in in rem proceedings has been held to require much less.
Notice by posting or by publication generally has been sufficient in
such proceedings to assure a person all of his constitutional rights.
This has been true when the state has been acting directly on the
res, and is settling right and title thereto.' 2
Contrary to state court practice," the United States Supreme Court
has refused to decide a case solely by classifying it as a proceeding
either in rem or in personam. As was said in Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank and Trust Co.,
Without disparaging the usefulness of distinctions between actions
in rem and those in personam in many branches of the law, or on other
issues, or the reasoning which underlies them, we do not rest the
8 Martin v. Wheatley, 62 F. Supp. 104, 107 (W.D. Ark. 1945). See 1 C.J.S., Actions
§ 52 (1936).9 Werbe v. Holt, 98 F. Supp. 614, 617 (W.D. Ark. 1951). For a lucid explanation
of the terminology see Gassert v. Strong, 38 Mont. 18, 98 Pac. 497, 500 (1908). See
also Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 CoLum. L. Rtlv. 37, 106, 288 (1915).
10 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 72-73 (3rd ed. 1949) ; STUNMERG, CoNFIcr OF LAWS §§ 69-71 (2nd ed. 1951).
11 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Substituted service of process on nonresidents has been upheld, when there has
been some method provided to insure notice of suit. Generally, litigation has been
restricted to automobile accident cases, suits involving a corporation carrying on a
business within the jurisdiction, or cases wherein consent may be found. See
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.,
346 U.S. 338 (1953) (Autos). International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra;
Traveler's Health Assoc. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (Business); GOODRICH,
CONFLICr OF LAWS § 73 (3rd ed. 1949).
12 1 MERRILL, NOTICE § 518 (1952).
is See Winnebago Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Wisconsin Midland Ry. Co., 81 Wis. 385,
51 N.W. 576 (1892) ; City of Newark v. Yeskel, 5 N.J. Super 313, 74 A2d 883 (1950) ;
Collins v. City of Wichita, 225 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1955). See the excellent dissent of
Justice Oliphat in the Yeskel case, supra. See also Churchill v. Bigelow, 333 Mass.
,129 N.E.2d 903 (1955).
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power of the state to resort to constructive service in this proceeding
upon how its courts or this Court may regard this historical anti-
thesis.14
The Mullane case, and Walker v. City of Hutchinson, both pre-
sumably proceedings in rem, set forth the rule that
*. . if feasible, notice reasonably calculated to inform parties of pro-
ceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected
interests must be given."-
It is clear that were the rule read literally, an effort must be made
tor inform known persons that their rights will be affected, whenever
notification is feasible or reasonable. Persons who are unknown or
absentees may be notified satisfactorily by the traditional forms of
publication or posting. The limits of the rule probably will be de-
termined by what is administratively feasible as related to whomso-
ever is charged with the duty to give notice. Further, it is believed
that the requirements that will be laid down can be fair and need not
be onerous.
A remaining question is, how far must one search in order to as-
certain whether a person is "known," and what is his address? Must
city and state records be used if they should be within the reach of
the notifying person acting under the state power? Does the search
extend to records outside of an administrator's office? Must one
search all state records? Does the rule require a search to be made in
the local telephone directory, or city directory? Do "records" include
the general knowledge of the community? An examination of a num-
ber of recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court will shed
light on these questions.
RECENT U.S. SurPimm CoURT DEcIsIONs
The leading case is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co."' Here, a state statute permitted the pooling of small trust estates
into one large fund for investment purposes. Periodic accountings
were called for. The only notice required or given of an impending
accounting was published. The notice contained the name and address
of the trust company, the name and date of establishment of the com-
mon trust fund, and a list of the participating estates. Prior to the
first investment of the common fund, each person known to the trustee
14 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
15 77 S.Ct. 200, 202 (1956).
10 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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as one entitled to the income or principal of the trust was notified
of the event by mail. This notice technique was attacked under the
fourteenth amendment.
It was held that notice by publication, under these circumstances,
did not give the persons sought to be bound proper notice which would
accord them their constitutional rights. Since the trustee knew the
names and addresses of the beneficiaries, there was no tenable ground
for not giving them personal notice. The reason the published notice
was defective was that under the circumstances, it was feasible to give
notice reasonably calculated to reach those who could have been in-
formed easily by the best possible means at hand. Seemingly, the
notice need not reach everyone, but only those most likely to safeguard
the interests of all.
Thus, apparently, if the person seeking to give notice has the name
and address within his personal reach, there is no constitutional reason
for not giving personal notice to one in danger of being divested of
some legal interest. The best notice possible under the circumstances
must be given."
In the recent case of Walker v. City of Hutckinson,8 the plaintiff
owned land in the city of Hutchinson, Kansas. Pursuant to statute,19
defendant city moved to condemn land by determining that it was
needed for public use. Three appointed commissioners assessed the
damages. By statute, the commissioners were required to give notice
to landowners and lienholders of record either by giving ten days
notice in writing or by publishing notice once in the official city news-
paper. Published notice was made and damages determined. Plaintiff
sought to enjoin the city from trespassing upon his property, contend-
ing that he had been denied his constitutional rights under the "due
process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. Both the trial court
and the Kansas Supreme Court held that published notice accorded to
the plaintiff all of the notice and opportunity for hearing to which he
was entitled."0 The state court reasoned that this was true since the
proceeding was in rem, and that, historically, published notice was
sufficient. The plaintiff appealed and was granted review.21
The majority saw the issue before the Court to be whether or not
17 See Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100
U. PA. L. REv. 305 (1951); Note, 25 WAsH. L. REv. 282 (1950).
is 77 S.Ct. 200 (1956).
19 KAN. GEN. STAT. of Kan. §§ 26-201, 26-202 (1949).
20 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 178 Kan. 263, 284 P.2d 1073 (1955).
21 350 U.S. 930 (1955).
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newspaper publication alone, as a prerequisite to proceedings to fix
compensation in condemnation cases, measures up to the quality of
notice required by the due process clause.
Resting on Mullane,,2 the Court held that procedural due process
had not been afforded to this plaintiff, and reversed the prior decisions.
The rule enunciated by the Court was that
* .. if feasible, notice must be reasonably calculated to inform parties
of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally
protected interests.23
The notice given " . . .may vary with circumstances and con-
ditions."'" One of the circumstances and conditions where less than
actual notice may be given occurs when unknown or missing persons
are involved. There is no rigid formula laid down; the rule is flexible
in its entirety. No adherence is given to the categorization made by the
state court of the proceeding being in rem.
The Court recognizes that publication is grossly inadequate to con-
vey information that a person's rights will be affected. In the Walker
case, plaintiff's name and address were known to the city. Plaintiff's
name was on its official records. Thus,
Even a letter would have appraised him that his property was about
to be taken and that he must appear if he wanted to be heard as to
its value.25
The city relied upon Huling v. Kaw Valley Railway & Improvement
Co."6 In Huling, plaintiff, a nonresident, complained that land taken
pursuant to a condemnation statute denied him due process of law.
The statute provided for thirty days notice by publication before
damages were fixed. The Court held that the plaintiff had not been
denied due process, and said that
... this was all the notice they had a right to require.2 7
The distinction drawn by the Court was that in the Walker case
plaintiff was a resident, while in Huling plaintiff was a nonresident.
Although the Huling decision was not overruled, its very existence as
operative law is threatened. Thus,
22 See note 16 supra.
23 See note 15 supra.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
26130 U.S. 559 (1889).
27 Id. at 563.
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.. . we are not called upon to consider the extent to which Mullane
may have undermined the reasoning of the Huling decision.28
The requirements of Mullane and Walker are not burdensome in
the eyes of the Court. It said,
Nor is there any reason to suspect that it [the Walker decision] will
interfere with the orderly condemnation of property to preserve ef-
fectively the citizen's rights to a hearing in connection with just com-
pensation.29
A letter is enough.
Justice Frankfurter dissented, saying that from the pleadings and
record, he was uncertain what relief this plaintiff desired. Did plaintiff
want to contest the taking of the land, or the amount of the award,
or to restrain the city from entry so that he might have another hearing
to fix compensation; or did he wish to obtain a permanent injunction
from entry? Frankfurter believed the taking of the land to be con-
stitutional, the only doubt being the question of reasonableness of the
amount of the award. Since this question had not been properly
raised, he felt that the state decision should be affirmed."0
The separate dissent of Justice Burton partially spells out the scope
of the majority's decision when he says,
Particularly, I am not ready to throw a cloud of uncertainty upon the
validity of condemnation proceedings ... 31
In another recent case, City of New York v. New York, N.H., & H.
Ry. Co., 2 the city sought to enforce liens raised by services provided
by it. The railroad went into receivership. Published notice was given,
calling for creditors to present claims. The liens were sought to be
enforced after the non-claim statute had run. The United States Su-
preme Court held that published notice was not enough to cut off
creditors' claims. Resting on Mullane, there was no indication that the
Court felt the contention that the proceeding was in rem was signifi-
cant.8
The obvious conclusion drawn is that the receiver was obligated
to scan his records to determine who the bankrupt's creditors were,
and to inform them personally that their claims were subject to being
28 77 S.Ct. at 203 (1956).
29 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
3177 S.Ct. at 208 (1956).
32 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
33 See the dissent, In re New York, N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 197 F2d 428 (2nd Cir.
1952).
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cut off. It is not a heavy burden to search a business's "accounts
payable," and mail a notice that some action must be taken by the
creditor.
A later case reiterates the demand that the notice given must be
meaningful. In order to be meaningful, more than a resort to the empty
requirements of a statute must be made, however valid compliance
with the statute might be under ordinary circumstances.
In Covey v. Town of Somers, 4 plaintiff was a landowner in Somers,
New York. Upon failure to pay her taxes, a tax lien was impressed
upon her property. Published notice, posted notice, and notice by
mail were given. A judgment of foreclosure was rendered, and a deed
to her property given the town. Five days later plaintiff was adjudged
insane and committed to a state mental institution. After commitment,
the property was sold, but not before plaintiff's guardian, who had been
appointed after the foreclosure judgment, had tendered the unpaid
taxes plus interest to the defendant.
The state courts approved the action of the town, but the United
States Supreme Court held that due process had been denied since
... she had been known to the town to be an incompetant for fifteen
years.35
Thus, the Court ruled, in effect, that when the state knows (or reason-
ably should know) that it is dealing with an incompetent, the state
must insure that the notice is effective to afford protection to his legal
rights. Exact compliance with the foreclosure statute was not enough.
The fact of incompetency may never appear on the tax rolls of the
town, but a significant footnote appeared in the opinion to the effect
that Somers, New York, has a population of two hundred." Thus,
where the municipal body is small in area and population, the general
knowledge of the community will be imputed to the governing authori-
ties.
In another recent case, Standard Oil v. New Jersey," New Jersey's
Escheat Act was attacked. The contention was that it operated to
deny due process. Stock dividends, wages and other claims were de-
clared to escheat to the state if the owner were unknown or had not
been heard from for fourteen years. The only provision for notice
34 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Note, 55 Micir. L. REv. 287 (1956).
35 351 U.S. at 146.
38 See 100 L.Ed.Advance, p. 573 (1956). The permanent U.S. report does not carry
this particular footnote.
37341 U.S. 428 (1951).
19371
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was personal notice to the holder of the claim, and published notice
to the world at large. This was held not to violate due process. The
decision may be explained on the basis that the Court viewed the
escheat as being only a change in depositories, since the claims could
be regained from the state for a period of two years following the
seizure. Further, the corporate depository had made at least one
attempt to reach the owner, and therefore the state could validly pre-
sume that the owner was an unknown or absentee."8
A companion case to Walker evidences that the state is not an abso-
lute insurer that actual notice will be received. In Nelson v. City of
New York,"9 the exact counterpart of the statute in the Covey case
was before the Court." Notice of foreclosure was posted, published,
and mailed after the plaintiff failed to pay his taxes. The property
was sold, and the plaintiff contested the proceeding relying on Mullane
and Covey. It was held that, while the plaintiff's bookkeeper wrong-
fully had concealed the tax bills and notice of foreclosure, these facts
were of no aid to the plaintiff since the city could not be charged
with the careless and wrongful conduct of the plaintiff's servants.
Thus, the whole approach is pragmatic. Whether or not the notice
given shall withstand an attack based on due process grounds must
be determined by answers to the following questions. If published
notice has been made, is it reasonably calculated to inform persons
that their rights will be affected with finality? Is it feasible to give
personal notice under the circumstances?
WASHINGTON STATUTES41 AND CASE AUTHORITIES
EMINENT DOMAIN
Washington's eminent domain statutes42 seem to comply with the
requirements of the Walker and Mullane decisions. Personal service
must be made on every person who is known to the state as an owner,
encumbrancer, tenant, or otherwise interested therein. Ten days notice
must be given before presenting a petition for condemnation.' The
provision dealing with nonresidents raises a danger signal. The statute
reads:
In all cases where the owner or person claiming an interest in such
real estate [that property which is the subject of the condemnation
38 See dissent, City of Newark v. Yeskel, 5 NJ. Super. 313, 74 A2d 883, 891 (1950);
see also Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
39 77 S.Ct. 195 (1956).
40 See note 34 supra.
41 RCW 4.28.100 may cut across the statutes discussed. This statute is entitled
"Commencement of Actions," and reads to the effect that when a defendant cannot be
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proceeding] or other such property is a nonresident of this state, . . .
and an affidavit of the attorney general shall be filed that such owner
or person is a nonresident of this state .... service may be made by
publication thereof in any newspaper published in the county where
such lands are situated once a week for two successive weeks.
44
It is possible that some reliance could be placed on the Huling
decision for the proposition that personal notice to a nonresident is
not required, and that published notice would accord a nonresident
his due. However, to resort to publication alone would be most pre-
carious indeed, in the light of the language of the Walker decision.
Even if the Walker decision overrules Huling, another argument is
possible. All service under the statute need not be considered defective
because of the statute's failure to provide for personal notice to non-
residents, since the Washington Court in State ex rel. Thomas v. Supe-
rior Court 5 construed a similar statute to the effect that personal
service on a known nonresident, service being made out of the state
of Washington, would be deemed the same as service by publication.
Also, RCW 4.28.180 reads to the effect that personal service on a
defendant out of state shall be the equivalent of service by publica-
tion." Thus, personal service on nonresidents would satisfy both the
statute and the due process clause.
In determining who is entifled to notice, the general rule is that
one need only examine the record titles before commencement of con-
demnation.'7 It might be well, however, for the person charged with
the duty of giving notice to consider what influence, if any, Covey v.
Town of Somers, and City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.
Ry. Co. will exert in this area.
found within the state, and that after a search is made, the plaintiff may file an affidavit
that the defendant cannot be found. He then is authorized to make service by publica-
tion after he has mailed a copy of summons to the defendant at his last known address.
The mailing of a summons would supply notice that certain legal interests will be put
in issue, and give notice and opportunity to be heard, thus fulfilling the requirements
of due process.42RCW 8.04. (State); RCW 8.08. (Counties); RCW 8.12. (Cities); RCW 8.16.
(School Districts); RCW 8.20. (Corporations); RCW 8.24. (Private Ways of
Necessity).43 RCW 8.04.010, .020.
4 RCW 8.04.020.
46 42 Wash. 521, 85 Pac. 256 (1906).
"o See Lawyer Land Co. v. Steel, 41 Wash. 411, 83 Pac. 896 (1906); Roznik v.
Becker, 68 Wash. 63, 122 Pac. 593 (1912).
47 Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wash. 444, 100 Pac. 991 (1909). For examples as to who
is not entitled to notice, see North River Boom Co. v. Smith, 15 Wash. 138, 45 Pac.
750 (1896); State ex rel. Suksdorf v. Superior Court, 169 Wash. 195, 13 P.2d 460(1932) ; State cx. reL. Long v. Superior Court, 80 Wash. 417, 141 Pac. 906 (1914). The
exact type of service called for should be given. Should the statute call for a summons,
a show-cause order will not suffice. See State ex. rel. Hopman v. Superior Court, 88
1957]
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SummARY TAx PROCEEDINGS
REAL PROPERTY
The area of summary tax enforcement and collection procedures
has offered a fertile ground for the delinquent taxpayer to raise the
issue of due process."
In Washington, the statutory methods of enforcing collection of
delinquent taxes against real property are spelled out in RCW 84.64.
Alternative methods may be employed by the county treasurer to
enforce a tax lien. 9 He may give actual notice of the foreclosure pro-
ceeding, thereby creating no due process problem, or he may serve
both summons and notice by publication in one general notice.5" After
judgment, and after notice of sale is given by posting in three public
places,"' the property can be sold." The employment of publication
alone does create a due process problem.
The rule in Washington is that tax foreclosure proceedings are in
rem, and that published notice is sufficient notice to acquaint the tax-
payer that he is in danger of losing his property. " Justification for
the rule is given by explanations that the taxpayer is bound to know
that this would happen, 4 that the interest of the state in raising
revenue demands that" . . . the methods at the disposal of the state
... must be swift and simple... ,"I or that the state has graciously
given the taxpayer more time than he deserves.5"
This method of making notice must be suspect if the United States
Supreme Court in Mullane, Walker and Covey meant that as to
known persons, whether the proceeding is in rem or in personam,
... if feasible, notice reasonably calculated to inform parties of pro-
ceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected
interests must be given.57
Wash. 612, 153 Pac. 315 (1915) ; Davis v. Woolen, 191 Wash. 379, 71 P2d 172 (1937);
Muscek v. Equitable Savings and Loan Assoc., 25 Wn2d 546, 171 P.2d 856 (1946).
48 Cf. Whatcom County v. Black, 90 Wash. 280, 155 Pac. 1071 (1916) ; Williams v.
Pittock, 35 Wash. 271, 77 Pac. 385 (1904) ; Eldridge, Property Tax Collection Pro-
cedure in Washington, 17 WAsH. L. RE-v. 123 (1942).
49 RCW 84.60.020 reads that upon failure to pay taxes, a tax lien arises. See RCW
84.64.010, .030, .050.
5o RCW 84.64.050.
51 RCW 84.64.080-.100.
52 RCW 84.64.070, .100.
53 Napier v. Runkel, 9 Wn2d 246, 114 P2d 534 (1941) ; Colby v. Himes, 171 Wash.
83, 17 P.2d 606 (1932); See McAllister, Taxpayers' Remedies-Washington Property
Taxes, 13 WAsH. L. Rrv. 91 (1938).
54 See Williams v. Pittock, 35 Wash. 271, 77 Pac. 385 (1904).
55 Note, 55 MICH. L. Rxv. 287, 289 (1956) ; See Devitt v. Milwaukee, 261 Wis. 276,
52 N.W2d 872 (1952).
56 See note 54 supra.
57 77 S.Ct. at 202.
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The reasonableness of notification of pending action by means of
publication has been and is being subjected to much well deserved
criticism.58 Therefore, the question would be whether or not it would
be unfeasible to inform by personal service either a single taxpayer
or a group of taxpayers that their interest in property is in jeopardy.
Since the name and address of the taxpayer is upon the tax rolls of
the treasurer," and since this information may appear within the
published summons and notice," the burden imposed by requiring
personal notice is without question reasonable in terms of expense and
effort.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Summary procedures which may be employed against an owner of
personal property, who is a delinquent taxpayer, are set forth in
RCW 84.56. The distraint and seizure section"' has been construed
to require no notice to the taxpayer that his property is being seized,
other than posting of notice of distraint on or near the property.
Further, notice by posting is sufficient to acquaint an owner that his
personal property is being sold. In construing the statute (RCW 84.-
56.070), great weight was placed on the fact that personal notice is
to be given that taxes are due and payable.62
To employ the foregoing procedure is sufficient when the property
is deemed movable by the county treasurer. However, if the property
be considered stationary, or reasonably immovable, before seizure
can be deemed complete the county treasurer must give the owner
personal notice of the impending action and that a sale will be held of
the property seized.6" When property is deemed movable by the
county treasurer, and he employs only notice by posting before seizure
and sale, it is questionable whether or not such a procedure could
stand if an attack were raised under the due process clause.
Summary tax proceedings have been classified as in rem to both
58 Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity.-An, Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 305 (1951); Comment, The Effect of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
Trust Company Upon Publication of Notice in Iowa, 36 IowA L. Rsv. 47 (1950);
Notes, 5 MizA. L. Q. 153; 31 WASH. L. REv. 170 (1956).
r' Compare Spokane County ex rel. Sullivan v. Glover, 2 Wn.2d 162, 97 P.2d 628(1940) with the present language in RCW 84.56.050 and with Eldridge, Property Tax
Collection Procedure in WTashington, 17 WASH. L. REv. at 132 (1942).60 RCW 84.64.050, .030; Napier v. Runkel, 9 Wn.2d 246, 114 P2d 534 (1941) ; Luff
v. Gowan, 38 Wash. 504, 80 Pac. 766 (1905).
61 RCW 84.56.070.
62 Metzger v. Quick 46 Wn.2d 477, 282 P.2d 812 (1955) ; Note, 31 WASH. L. REv.
170 (1956).
63 RCW 84.56.080.
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real and personal property.6" If Covey v. Town of Somers should not
be restricted to incompetents, if New York v. New York, N.H.
& H. Ry. Co. should not be restricted to bankruptcy proceedings, if
Walker v. City of Hutchinson should not be restricted to eminent
domain proceedings, and if Mullane should not be restricted to a trus-
teeship proceeding, but applicable to in rem proceedings in general,
then seemingly, the requirement that
... if feasible, notice reasonably calculated to inform parties of pro-
ceedings ... 65
has not been met.
Fairness to the taxpayer, as well as a desire to protect the county
treasurer or a subsequent purchaser would demand some type of
notice equal to that outlined by the procedure to be employed by the
county treasurer in the distraint and sale of immovable property. Thus,
actual notice should be given the offending taxpayer if he is known to
the state. It is difficult to see what impelling interest of the state may
be injured by requiring the treasurer to mail a letter acquainting the
taxpayer of the status of affairs, thereby giving him an opportunity
to act and to be heard. The name and address of the taxpayer are
carried on the tax rolls.6" This information is a part of the records
of the county treasurer's office. It would seem neither unfeasible nor
unreasonable to require the county treasurer to give such notice.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS OF LOCAL BOND ISSUES
A means of insuring the validity of local bond issues by the use of
a declaratory judgment is set forth in RCW 7.25. No reported cases
may be found in Washington in which this particular portion of the
code has been tested or construed."' Briefly, it provides that if a munic-
ipal corporation should desire to test the validity of a local bond issue,"'
a complaint shall issue and all taxpayers within the boundary of the
municipal corporation shall be named defendants. Service is to be
made upon one or more taxpayers as a representative taxpayer of the
district, but other taxpayers may intervene.6 9
64 See People v. Skinner, 18 Cal2d 349, 115 P.2d 488 (1941) ; Puget Sound Power
and Light Co. v. Cowlitz County, 38 Wn.2d 907, 234 P.2d 506 (1951); Coolidge v.
Pierce County, 28 Wash. 95, 68 Pac. 391 (1902).
65 77 S.Ct. at 202.
6 RCW 84.56.050. See Pierce County v. Newbegin, 27 Wn.2d 451, 178 P.2d 742
(1947).
67 But see the cases involving RCW 7.24.; Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash.
96, 73 P.2d 341 (1937).6s RCW 7.25.010.(9 RCW 7.25.020.
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The judgment is declared effective to determine the validity of the
bonds.' Further,
... all provisions of the laws of Washington relating to declaratory
judgments shall apply.71
Under RCW 7.24.110 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, " . . . all
persons who have... any interest which would be affected... " are
necessary parties. While RCW 7.25.020 (Declaratory Judgment;
Local Bond Issue - Complaint - Defendants - Service) does not speak
of publication, authority for notice by publication to the unnamed
defendant can be found.72
Under the provisions of the Local Bond Act, the question would
be whether or not service by publication or service on the representa-
tive taxpayer only would suffice to bind those not personally served-
the form of process not being subject to attack on due process grounds.
In Castevens v. Stanley County'3 the North Carolina Court had this
exact problem before it. Here, in a prior suit, a decree had been
rendered that a bond issue and tax levy were valid. Actual service
had been made upon a taxpayer sued in a representative capacity.
Other taxpayers, including the plaintiff in the present suit, had been
served by publication. The plaintiff contended that since he was not
served personally, he was not bound by the prior decision. The court
declared the attack unwarranted, and the plaintiff bound. Service by
publication was deemed sufficient because the proceeding was "... in
the nature of a proceeding in rem."I
From Walker and Mullane, the rule is that, if feasible, actual notice
must be given. Where there is a proceeding in the nature of a class
suit,"5 or where, as under the circumstances contemplated by the De-
claratory Judgments statutes, a bond issue is being tested, it would be
unreasonable and constitute an unnecessary expense to the taxing dis-
trict to serve each taxpayer personally.
May it not be presumed that the representative taxpayer will act
to protect the interest of the taxpayers not personally served?,6 Does
70 RCW 7.25.030.
71 RCW 7.25.040.
72 See Felsinger v. Quinn, 62 Wash. 183, 185, 113 Pac. 275, 276 (1911), the publica-
tion would be disregarded as a mode of service.
"3211 N.C. 642, 191 S.E. 739 (1937).
74 191 S.E. at 744.
'
5 See Kentucky Home Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Duling, 190 F2d 797 (6th Cir.
1951) to the effect that there must be protection of absent parties to comply with due
process.
76 See Behrman v. Egan, 9 N.J. Super. 171, 75 A2d 627 (1950); Omaha Hotel Co.
v. Wade, 97 U.S. 13 (1877).
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not the opportunity to intervene exist if one should desire to avail
himself of this remedy? Would not the usual widespread publicity of
a pending bond issue sufficiently acquaint a taxpayer that his interest
will be affected? To hold such a proceeding to be consistent with due
process would not do violence to the recent line of cases beginning
with Mullane.
PROBATE
Washington, in common with other jurisdictions, has not afforded
Mullane a cordial welcome." In New York Merchandise Co. v.
Stout,"' plaintiff, a creditor, attacked the Washington non-claim stat-
ute. 9 Very properly, he raised the issue of its constitutionality, con-
tending that the only notice called for was that of publication; that
the administratrix of the decedent debtor had published such notice;
and that, as a result of the running of the non-claim statute, his rights
had been cut off. The creditor cited Mullane as authority that the
statute and the procedure followed denied him due process. The court
answered that the creditor could not rest his case on due process be-
cause Mullane applied only where property rights were brought before
the court for adjudication in a trusteeship proceedingl
The New York Merchandise Co. case result is untenable on the
basis of the Mullane, Walker and New York, N.H. & H. Ry. Co.
decisions. RCW 11.40.010 provides that if a creditor's claims against
a decedent debtor be not filed within six months after publication of
notice that claims are to be presented, then such claims are barred.
The non-claim statute is constitutional as to creditors unknown or
absent, but as to those creditors known to the personal representative,
it would not be unreasonable nor unfeasible to expect more. Is it im-
practical or unreasonable for a personal representative at least to scan
the records of a decedent and by letter make known to those indi-
viduals who are shown to be creditors that their rights are subject to
being cut off? It is submitted that the burden imposed would not be
burdensome, nor unreasonable.
In a later case, In re Shew's Estate,0 plaintiffs were the known
77 See City of Newark v. Yeskel, 5 N.J. Super 313, 74 A.2d 883 (1950) ; Collins v.
City of Wichita, 225 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 886 (1955). But
see Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. State, 149 Wash. Dec. 502, 304 P.2d 676(1956).
78 43 Wn.2d 825, 264 P.2d 863 (1953).
7o RCW 11.40.010.80 48 Wn.2d 732, 296 P2d 667 (1956).
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heirs of the decedent. An award in lieu of homestead"' was made of
the widow of the decedent. Citing Mullane, the plaintiffs attacked the
award and statute on the ground that they had been denied due process
because the statute did not call for notice to them before granting the
award. The court said that there had been no denial of due process
because
The Mullane case was a proceeding in personam... The proceeding
herein is in ren. s2
The result in the Skew case is consistent with Walker and Mullane,
but the reasoning is at variance with the reasoning in those cases.
RCW 11.76.040 requires that notice be given to known heirs and
distributees within twenty days after the appointment of an executor
or administrator. Twenty days before a hearing on the final report
and petition for distribution, another notice must be given by the
executor or administrator. 3 Certainly an heir or distributee must know
that an award in lieu of homestead may be made as a matter of course
during the probate of an estate, as here, and that a person who intends
to object to such an award must be put to some duty to guard his
own interests. This interest will receive adequate protection by the
use of RCW 11.28.240 which requires that after request is made,
the executor or administrator will extend personal notice of certain
pending matters to the person requesting such notice."4 Another reason
is that an award in lieu of homestead is a statutory right of the widow.
Further, unless the statutory grounds for setting the award aside are
shown, the heir or distributee has no standing to challenge the award."5
CONCLUSION
The foregoing by no means exhausts the legal material concerning
notice in Washington. The anachronism of posting and publication as
a means of notification is destined to disappear except, perhaps, as a
gesture for the sake of appearances. Thus, as to unknown persons,
the necessity for any notice will disappear since publication is no-
toriously ineffective.
81 RCW 11.52.010.
8248 Wn2d at 734, 296 P.2d at 669.
83 See Gose and Hawley, Probate Legislation Enacted by the 1955 Session of the
Washington Legislature, 31 WASH. L. REv. 22 (1956). Attention is invited to page 34.
84 See In re Pugh's Estate, 22 Wn.2d 514, 156 P.2d 676 (1945) ; Francon v. Cox, 38
Wn.2d 530, 231 P.2d 265 (1951).
81 See Francon v. Cox, supra note 84; In re Gherra's Estate, 44 Wn.2d 277, 267
P.2d 91 (1954) ; RCW 11.52.016, .024.
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In fairness, the appellate court in Washington has been zealous in
safeguarding the interests of the individual against abusive state
action. An indication that the court in Washington may change its
position regarding Mullane is seen in the very recent case of Washing-
ton Toll Bridge Authority v. Washington."8 An in rem statute being
contested required notice by publication only. The statute was found
to be unconstitutional on grounds other than due process. An encour-
aging sign was that several members of the court indicated their in-
tention of abandoning the intellectual hiatus of in rem - in personam by
saying that Mullane made questionable the provision that required
notice by mere publication."'
86149 Wash. Dec. 502, 304 P.2d 676 (1956).
87 No attempt has been made to discuss whether or not the statutes considered may
be declared void on their faces for failure to provide for actual notice. Note the tech-
nique employed in Justice Jackson's dissent in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295
(1951). The ultimate legal effect of a statute which may be declared unconstitutional
has not been considered in this comment. See ROTTSHAEFER, CONSTITUIONAL LAW
§§ 32-36 (1st ed. 1939).
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